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Chapter 4 
Game Theory and Power Theory: 
A Critical Comparison 
Wolfgang Balzer 
The last decade has witnessed the application of game theory to social 
science. Created by abstracting from social games like chess and bridge, 
von Neumann's model was seen to be applicable to more "serious" 
social phenomena as well: to situations with two or more agents with 
conflicting goals and with the ability to influence each other. Starting 
essentially from prisoner's dilemma (see below), research focused on 
models capturing "socially rational" behavior. After Michael Taylor's 
demonstration that such models were possible in terms of super-games,' 
a veritable explosion took place in sociological research using game- 
theoretic  model^.^ By now it seems fair to say that those branches of 
social science that deal with interaction and conflict in exact ways are 
dominated by the game-theoretic approach. 
On the other hand, studies of power continued to de-velop with 
the same slow pace they had for centuries, articulated mainly by prac- 
titioners of politics and by philosophers, and more recently by more 
professional  scientist^.^ In contrast to the flourishing of game theory, 
however, no comparable evolution took place in models of power. 
Only recently, an account by Thomas Wartenberg opened a broader 
perspective that may be said to combine more operational approaches 
(like Dahl's) and "internal" conceptual analysis with comprehensive 
views of social real it^.^ Wartenberg's account can be shown to com- 
bine most other approaches to power and to provide a frame in which 
all other special forms of power can be defined.5 In addition, it is 
presented in a conceptually clear, analytic form. For these reasons I 
will take his approach as the representative of power theory. 
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My aim in this paper is to analyze and compare the two ap- 
proaches-the game-theoretic and that of power-from the perspec- 
tive of applications in social science. The result of comparison will be 
stated in the form of a somewhat provocative thesis of incommensura- 
bility, and the analyses performed will be used to justify that thesis. 
My account of both approaches will concentrate on the basic mod- 
els (or most general theoretical assumptions) used on each side. It is 
not possible to consider all the specializations that have developed. 
This will not affect my results, however, because the two approaches 
may be conceptualized as theory-nets in which more special models, 
assumptions, or "pictures" are all built on one fundamental, basic 
model such that most questions of comparison between the full theory- 
nets in a precise sense reduce to questions of how the basic models are 
related.6 
Game Theory 
The classical social application of game theory is the prisoner's di- 
lemma. Two individuals, p, and p,, are arrested, say for the illegal 
possession of guns. The district attorney believes that they robbed a 
bank the other night, but he has no evidence. Both are put into jail in 
isolation and accused of bank robbery. The district attorney proposes 
the following deal to each pi individually. If pi confesses the bank 
robbery and pj does not confess, pi will get the preferred status of a 
chief witness and go to jail for one week. If pj does confess, pi will go to 
jail for five years; if neither confesses, they will both go to jail for one 
month for possession of a gun. Thus, each prisoner pi is faced with the 
following dilemma. If his friend @, j f i )  confesses, p, is also inclined to 
confess, otherwise he alone will get five years while his friend gets by 
with one week. .If the friend does not confess, then pi is still more 
inclined to confess for this will get him the minimal punishment. So 
whatever his friend may do, p, is inclined to confess. The situation is 
completely symmetric, so pj has the same inclinations. If both of them 
follow this line of reasoning dictated by individual rationality in the 
state of isolation, both of them will confess. This, however, leads both 
of them to the worst result they can achieve h that situation. So the 
dilemma is that applying the principle of individual rationality ob- 
tains the worst result, while a better result can only be obtained at the 
cost of "irrational" behavior. 
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In order to analyze this situation, game-theoretic apparatus uses 
the notions of individuals, of strategies or alternatives, and of preference 
or utili ty.  We will not deal here with iteration of moves or with "mixed 
strategies." For each individual p, there is a set of alternatives (moves, 
actions, courses of actions, sequences of moves) comprising exactly 
those that are entertainable by pi in the situation to be modeled. It is 
not necessary to spell out precisely what is meant by entertainable 
here. Usually, the set-is larger than the set of alternatives actually 
entertained, but smaller than the set of physically possible ones. It is 
usually restricted by the social and institutional frame in which the 
individual finds him~elf .~ In the example above, p, and p, both have 
two alternatives: to confess or not to confess. 
Each choice of an alternative by actor pi amounts to some action of 
p, that leads to subsequent events or states causally determined by this 
action. Out of the sequence of subsequent events, one distinguished 
event or state is picked out and made the subject of an evaluation by 
actor p,; we call it the resulting state. So each choice of an alternative by 
p, leads to some resulting state that is then evaluated by p,; p, reflects, 
or is assumed to know anyway, how much the resulting state is worth 
to her. In other words, there is a utility function for each individual pi 
that assigns some value to each state resulting from p,% choice of any 
alternative and the corresponding action. 
The crucial point is that pi's choice and action do not fu l ly  cause 
the resulting state; pips action is only a partial cause, that is, one event 
among others, which only together cause the resulting state. Because of 
the interactive nature of the situation, different moves of other agents 
will lead to different resulting states for a given individual p, even 
though pi sticks to his choice. In other words, one alternative chosen 
by p, will lead to different resulting states, depending on which alter- 
natives are chosen by the other agents. 
The example cited makes this very clear. If p, chooses the alterna- 
tive to confess, the resulting state that he evaluates depends on the 
choice of p,. If p, also chooses to confess, then the state resulting for p, 
from his choice is five years in jail. But if p, chooses not to confess, the 
state resulting for p, from p,'s action (to confess) is very different, 
namely one week in jail. The same holds for p,, of course. 
As the resulting state is (assumed to be) uniquely determined by 
the sum of all the individual's actions, game theorists assign utilities 
to the sums of such actions rather than to the resulting states. Once 
each individual has made his choice and taken the corresponding ac- 
tion, the resulting state will evolve "automatically" (causally). If there 
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are n (n 2 2) individuals, the "sum" or combination of their choices is 
represented by an n-tuple, <a,, . . . , an>, each a, representing the 
choice of individual p,. Formally, then, the arguments of the utility 
functions are taken from the space of all such n-tuples. For each indi- 
vidual p, and each combination <a,, . . . , an> of choices there is a 
utility value U, (a,, . . . , an) expressing the utility that individual p, 
has from the state resulting for him from combination <a,, . . . , an>. 
In the cited example, we may take the lengths of the periods in jail as 
indicators of (inverse) utility values: the longer the period in jail, the 
smaller the utility of that resulting state. In general, however, the utili- 
ties of one common resulting state need not be the same for different 
individuals. 
In summary, a basic model of game theory is made up of the fol- 
lowing items: 
1. a set of individuals p,, . . . , pn 
2. n corresponding sets A,, . . . , An of alternatives, one for each 
individual 
3. n utility functions U,, . . . , Un, which are all defined on the set 
of all n-tuples <a,, . . . , an> of elements of A,, . . . , A ,  and which 
all take real numbers as values. 
This material has to have a special form in order to pass muster as 
a proper model. In game theory the basic assumption of form is that 
the individuals choose rationally, in some sense. There is no unique 
explication of what a rational choice for p, is in a frame given by items 
1-3. The general idea is that the individuals choose such that the re- 
sulting states (or rather the corresponding n-tuples <a,, . . . , an> of 
actions, choices, or alternatives, as just explained) have some kind of 
"equilibirum property." The notion of equilibrium, in turn, may be 
defined along different lines, which in general are not equivalent. The 
most commonly used notion is that of Nash equilibrium. A combination 
of choices <a,, . . . , an> is a point of Nash equilibrium if and only if 
for any i I n, any deviation <a,, . . . , a,*, . . . ,an> with a,*+a, would 
result in some decrease of utility for p,: 
Ui (a,, . . . , a,: . . . , an) < U, (a,, . . . , an) 
One way to formulate the axiom of rationality is to say that each 
individual should choose, or will choose, an alternative that belongs 
to some point of Nash equilibrium, provided the game has such a 
point. In order to turn this into a more descriptive form we might add 
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to the model, for each individual p. one alternative ap E Ai which is 
interpreted as that alternative which pI actually chooses when the game 
is played. Collecting all these distinguished alternatives we obtain an 
n-tuple <a,o, . . . , ano>, and the axion of rationality basic in game 
theory says that this n-tuple is a point of Nash equilibrium. It should 
be noted that game theorists usually do not make explicit this move 
from the rule of behavior to a descriptive formulation. 
Instead of going intb details of refinements, we have to concen- 
trate on a more fundamental feature inherent explicitly or implicitly in 
the basic models described above, namely the status of the utility 
functions. Utilities are difficult to determine. It seems fair to say that 
up to now there is not a single method for a practical determination of 
utilities in "real-life" situations. There are some experimental determi- 
nations in laboratory situations, but it is not clear in what way these 
can be made to function in real-life situations without substantially 
changing such  situation^.^ Moreover, it is common sense that utilities 
are not stable over time: people may change their taste, and thus their 
utility. 
In game theory utilities are assumed to be given and stable. In the 
light of the previous considerations these assumptions are rather strong 
and unrealistic. We may rephrase the assumptions in terms of the 
notion of the rules of the game. Each game essentially is given by its 
rules; the only possible variations of a game are who participates and 
how many participate. In the conceptual frame of a simple game as 
described above there are two components that together make up the 
rules of such a game. 
Let us look at these components first in the special case of social 
games. Here, we first have the different alternatives open to each indi- 
vidual as determined by the rules of the game. If a player had some 
alternative not allowed by the rules, we would not say that she plays 
according to these rules or that she plays the game given by these 
rules. Second, there are the utility functions telling how much the 
players get out of the game. In the case of social games, game theorists 
often speak of payofffunctions instead of utilities. Each player's payoff 
is determined by the rules of the game, so the payoff functions are 
part of, or constitutive of, the rules of the game. Since there are no 
other components in the basic models, we may say that the sets of 
alternatives together with the utility (or payoff) functions in social 
games make up the rules of the game. This analysis is by no means 
forced. It makes precise our intuitive notion of the rules of the game in 
a natural way. 
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If we pass from social games to games in general, this definition of 
the rules of the game no longer seems self-evident, and thus needs 
further explanation. To see that the rules of the game may be identi- 
fied with the sets of alternatives and utility functions also in the gen- 
eral case, we have to further reflect on the notion of the rules of the 
game. What are the rules of the game on a more informal level? They 
are rules, of course, but this is a difficult concept, and we have nothing 
to say about it. Second, they determine the procedure of the game. 
This does not mean that once we know the rules we know precisely 
how the game will proceed. Certain choices can be made at every step. 
But the set of possible alternatives from which one has to choose is 
determined by the rules of the game. Moreover, the rules tell who 
wins and how much. Again, this is not determined a priori but de- 
pends on the actual course of the game. For a given course, however, 
the rules determine the gains and losses in a strict sense. Now if, in a 
general model of game theory, we look for the components that deter- 
mine the course of the game, we find those already mentioned: alter- 
natives and utilities. These two components work together to determine 
the course of the game, and there is no further component in the 
model with such an effect. This justifies identifying the two compo- 
nents as the rules of the game even in those general cases in which 
ordinary language would not apply the term. In the prisoner's di- 
lemma, the rules of the game are given externally. They consist of the 
possible choices (to confess or not to confess) and the different lengths 
of the periods in jail. Sometimes one normally speaks of rules of the 
game also in such contexts, but this is metaphorical. Note that the 
prisoners do not participate in the game voluntarily. 
For the justification of our final claim it will be important that 
game theory assures that the rules of the game are given and must not 
be changed by the players while the game is continuing. This has to be 
stressed because game theorists, when confronted with this line of 
reasoning, tend to belittle the assumption that the rules are given and 
to give an image according to which the rules of the game have a 
weaker and more flexible status. We have to be aware of the kind of 
evidence relevant for deciding such an issue. The evidence here can- 
not consist of a statement of one single game theorist who imagines a 
new theory having some notions in common with game theory, and 
who for whatever reason wants to call it "game theory." The evidence 
here can come only from historical and metascientific studies of the 
literature and self-representation of the whole group of game theo- 
rists. On such a basis we may claim that the rules of the game in fact 
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have the status of being given externally, or in advance. Game theory 
presupposes these rules; it does not aim at introducing, defining, or 
giving meaning to that notion. There is no space to argue for this in 
metascientific detail; we will only cite some authorities: "The rules of 
the game, however, are absolute commands. If they are ever infringed, 
then the whole transaction by definition ceases to be the game de- 
scribed by those r~ les . "~  A game is distinguished from a real situa- 
tion of conflict by being performed according to completely determined 
rules. . . . In order to make the game accessible to mathematical analy- 
sis the rules of the game have to be formulated exactly."1° "The general 
concept of a game therefore comprises the following three elements: 
(1) the sequence of steps decided on by persons or by chance; (2) the 
level of information of the players; and (3) a payoff f~nction."~~ These 
citations show that the rules of the game are essential to the game's 
identity: to change the rules means to change the game, that is, to play 
a dzrerent game. 
There is another allied assumption of game theory that usually is 
also ignored. To see this assumption, let us look at the typical case in a 
social game in which all the players accept the rules of the game 
before they start playing. This is a voluntary act on the part of each 
player. If a player is forced to participate, the payoff values derived 
from the rules of the game may be quite different from her "real" 
utilities. For instance, it may be of highest utility for her to lose the 
game if she knows her opponent has executed other winners in the 
past. To accept the rules of the game voluntarily is an indication of 
independence and of being roughly at the same level as the other 
players. As soon as one player is dependent on, or much inferior to, 
the other player, there is some probability that her utilities are not 
adequately represented by the payoff function determined by the rules. 
These considerations suggest the following broad corollary. The 
rules of the game will be respected in greater degree the more equal 
and independent of each other the participants are. We can express 
this in the form of a slogan: Given utilities indicate equality and inde- 
pendence. This is admittedly a very vague formulation. There is no 
space here to argue in detail for the connection between given rules 
and equality and independence. We have to leave the issue with the 
status of intuitive plausibility. To give it more force, the point may be 
illustrated by the flexibility of individual utilities. A person's utility 
function may change for various reasons, among which we certainly 
must include emotions. A player recognizing that the rules of the game 
are very (un)favorable to her may change her utility function just for 
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emotional reasons. Such emotions need not, but may, indicate strong 
dependencies or strong inequalities. Conversely, the presence of in- 
equalities or dependencies may indicate that utilities are not given 
and stable, but may quickly change. 
If this analysis is correct, the assumption of givenness of the rules 
of the game indicates another, more implicit, assumption: that the 
different players in a game are independent of each other and are 
roughly of equal status with respect to the game. Of course, the no- 
tions of independence and equality of status have here a large degree 
of variability and are further complicated by being relative to the par- 
ticular game. A master may play a game of chess with his slave. How- 
ever, we think that these assumptions have an important role in 
delineating the intended applications of game theory from other, con- 
trived applications. For example, it seems beside the point to analyze 
a fight for life or death as a game (though this is conceptually possible 
and is even done by game theorists). 
Theory of Power 
In order to describe Wartenberg's theory of power,'* let us also begin 
with an example. Consider some individual p,, a politician, whose 
history includes a dark side. Another individual, p,, coming to know 
about this talks to p,, threatens to tell the story to the local newspaper 
and in this way manages to get a job in the city administration. Clearly, 
this is an instance of p, exercising power over p,-though perhaps not 
of the most brute kind. 
As in game theory, each of the two individuals has a set of pos- 
sible alternatives before him, any one of which he may choose to the 
exclusion of the others. It is difficult to characterize such a set in 
abstracto. Certainly, any alternative has to be physically feasible; given 
the individual's means, we may imagine all possible causal conse- 
quences following from any action made possible by these means. 
However, the difficulty then is pushed back to determining what are 
an individual's means. To allow for any physically possible means 
would be unnecessarily general. In the example, p, might be much 
stronger and thus able to beat p,.-Howevek, because of their social 
context this would not increase his probability of getting a job and 
therefore such an alternative need not be considered from the begin- 
ning. In general, a characterization of the alternatives open to an indi- 
vidual will be strongly theoretical and will require consideration of 
the social system and the individual's special manner of socializa- 
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tion.I3 In the example the politician's space of actions may be taken to 
consist of four alternatives. First, he might do nothing and act as if no 
threat had been made. Second, he might wait but start preparing some 
campaign for survival in case the thing gets published. Third, he might 
behave "cooperatively," and use his influence to get p, a job in the city 
administration. Fourth, he might try to retaliate and threaten p, in 
some way. It is clear that many other possibilities might be considered, 
but the level of detail and of relevance depends on the concrete case. 
As a second theoretical component there is an assessment of the 
respective situation by that individual. Assessment has two compo- 
nents. First, it consists of an understanding of the situation and of the 
different alternatives on the individual's side. This is a basic term from 
the hermeneutic tradition, and a difficult one. It reflects at least two 
major human properties: intentionality and the 8bility of interpreta- 
tion. Any understanding of a situation depends on the interpreter's 
intentions. If I am in a hurry to reach a plane, my understanding of 
getting stuck in the subway is likely to focus on the incompetence of 
the workers, while in another situation I might see the incident as 
caused by a technical mistake, such as a short circuit. Similar differ- 
ences of understanding result from differences in interpretation. As a 
scientific interpretation my understanding of a rain dance is one of an 
exotic, esthetic cultural event, whereas as a magical interpretation, the 
event becomes a major social and political issue. Interpretation may 
depend on intention, and vice versa. Usually, however, interpretation 
further varies with other parameters, in particular with knowledge 
and special forms of socialization. Whether the same holds for inten- 
tions is less clear, and in our opinion very doubtful. Technically, the 
effect of understanding is to filter out a subset of alternatives from the 
set of all possible ones as those that are relevant and seriously consid- 
ered by the individual. In the example, we may assume that the 
politician's intention is not so friendly that he would get p, a job 
without the threat. Positively, his intention by and large may be to 
have an efficient administration in which performance is the major 
criterion for getting a job or losing it. His understanding of the situa- 
tion is also influenced by this intention. He interprets p,'s approach as 
a threat, which he might not if p, were a close relative or if the whole 
administration were known for being completely corrupt. In such an 
environment, the publication in the newspaper probably would not 
create any problem for him. We will not attempt to analyze more 
formally the notion of understanding in the following. 
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The second component of assessment consists of a valuation of the 
given, understood alternatives. Formally, a valuation may be repre- 
sented by means of a utility function. Each alternative gets assigned 
some numerical value. On the basis of these numbers, comparisons 
can be made of alternatives that by themselves are hard to compare, 
and rational decisions may be made by applying one or the other 
formal criteria of rationality. As was pointed out above, numerical 
representation of values or utilities is difficult to achieve in practice. If 
two numbers have been assigned, then the difficulty must have been 
overcome in the way in which these numbers were assigned. Since no 
real-life methods exist here, the real difficulties cannot be said to have 
been solved. In the example, the politician's valuation is hard to tell 
because this amounts to determining which of the four alternatives he 
prefers. If he is an active, aggressive character, alternative four (retalia- 
tion) might be his preferred reaction; if he is lazy, alternative one (do 
nothing) might be preferred; and so on. 
In the context of the present stage of power analysis, there is no 
need for quantitative analysis. However, in order to facilitate compari- 
son we take each individual p,'s valuation as represented by a function 
that maps alternatives into real numbers. We require V, to be a 
partial function only, so that some alternatives may pass unevaluated. 
Following Wartenberg, the three components, alternatives, under- 
standing, and valuation, may be said to form an individual's action- 
environment. An action-environment then has the form 
<p,A, UN, V> 
where A is individual p's set of alternatives, UN p3 understanding, 
and V p's valuation of a given situation. 
In general, the action-environments of different individuals may 
be rather different; it would be too unrealistic to require them to be 
very similar or even identical for similar individuals. However, some 
weak form of similarity constraint seems realistic and appropriate. If 
individuals have been brought up in the same social group under very 
similar conditions and have acquired similar social positions and roles, 
there is some plausibility to the idea that their action-environments 
will have some similarity, just as in microeconomics the use of such 
"stability assumptions" is important because it yields strong empirical 
claims (at the risk, of course, of being too idealized or "false"). 
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We now may describe the basic model of power theory. It captures 
situations in which one person exercises power over another person. 
The fundamental axiom characterizing such a model says that one of 
the individuals exercises power over the other. This informal require- 
ment may be made precise in the conceptual frame outlined in the 
following way: 
p exercises power over p* if and only if p intentionally changes p*S 
action-environment in a fundamental manner.14 
Basically, therefore, to exercise power means to change some action- 
environment. Any change consists of a transition from one state to 
another, so we arrive at a quasistatic representation in which change 
of an action-environment is described by two succeeding action envi- 
ronments E(b) and E(a) (b and a as in before anddafter) such that the 
latter is different from the former. For given individual p, let us write 
E,(b) and El(a) to denote plS action-environments before and after some 
change. We may identify the two action-environments with that change 
itself, provided they are different from each other. So we define a 
change of action-environment to be a pair <E(b),E(a)> of two different 
action-environments of one individual such that E(a) follows after E(b) 
in time. Using this ontology, a model of power theory consists of a 
set {p,p*] of two individuals and four action-environments 
E(b),E(a),E*(b),E"(a): 
where E(b), E(a) are the two succeeding action-environments of indi- 
vidual p, E"(b), E*(a) are those of individual p", and E(b), E*(b) are 
simultaneous. In order to be a proper model, such an entity has to 
satisfy the above-stated axiom of change, i.e., one of the individuals 
exercises power over the other. If, for instance, p exercises power over 
p* this means that p intentionally changes p"'s action-environment in a 
fundamental manner, the change being represented by <E*(b),E*(a)>. 
The requirement of the change being fundamental can be read in 
two ways. It may be read as a threshold for degrees of change to be 
overcome in order to constitute an exertion of power, or it may be read 
as making the definition fuzzy. We do not prefer either of these op- 
tions. The question may be a matter of further development of the 
theory. "Intentional" is necessary to exclude unintended changes from 
counting as exercises of power. If I injure somebody by crashing into 
her car unintentionally, we do not say that I exercised power over her 
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though the result may be a very fundamental change of her action- 
environment. 
On the basis of the defined notion of exercising power it is easy to 
introduce the notion of having power by means of counterfactuals. p has 
power over p* if and only if there exist situations in which p could 
exercise power over p* by acting accordingly. 
"Change" may occur in one of three types or combinations, de- 
pending upon the three components making up an action-environ- 
ment. First, the set of alternatives may be changed, existing alternatives 
may be taken away, new alternatives may be added, or both possibili- 
ties may occur in the same step. Second, the understanding of the 
situation may be changed. And third, the valuation may be changed. 
Each of these changes may occur in isolation, but mixed cases also are 
possible: if a new alternative is added, it may be valuated in the same 
process. This amounts to a simultaneous change of the valuation func- 
tion. In the above example, the politician's set of alternatives may be 
seen as being enlarged. Though this sounds counterintuitive at first 
sight, we think it is the correct way to see the situation. The "new" 
alternatives coming into play are those different from the first one, 
those in which he reacts to the threat in some way. Though these 
alternatives were physically possible to him even before the threat was 
made, it is unlikely that he would have thought of them or would 
have taken them into account in his actions. Of course, the situation 
may also be described by including those alternatives in the set of 
alternatives from the beginning and assuming that the politician did 
not understand them or, if he did, did not evaluate them. The most 
natural description, however, seems to be one in which they do not 
occur originally. 
The models introduced capture the most basic form of exercise of 
power. Other interesting forms are obtained by adding further, special 
requirements, h r  instance on the particular way in which the action- 
environments are changed. In this way, the most important forms of 
power, force, coercion, influence, manipulation, may be characterized.15 
A final remark about the model is that the axiom of change essen- 
tially is antisymmetrical. Only one of the two individuals, the so called 
superordinate agent (formally it does not matter which one) exercises 
power, and in this case the action-environmeht of the other individual, 
who is called the subordinate agent, is changed. The model does not 
specify the superordinate agent's action by which she causes the sub- 
ordinate agent's action-environment to change. The superordinate 
agent's action-environment does not play any role in this formulation. 
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In formal terms, however, symmetry is not excluded. In a model of the 
theory of power it may well be the case that one individual p exercises 
power over the other individual p*, and simultaneously p* exercises 
power over p. Such kinds of symmetry in real applications usually 
reveal different forms or kinds of power exercised in the two direc- 
tions. For instance, p may exercise power in the form of coercion over 
p*, while p* at the same time manipulates p (stupid master p and 
clever slave p*). Inclusion of the superordinate agent's action-environ- 
ment in the models provides a frame for insertion of the items just 
mentioned. 
Comparison 
r. 
There is not enough space here for accounts of both theories' historical 
developments, which certainly would further the comparison. We will 
confine ourselves to the systematic level on which there are different 
criteria of comparison: formal structure, method of application, nature 
of objects, problems, problem-solving capacity, empirical content, suc- 
cess. This list is certainly not complete, and it must be admitted that 
the theory of power described in the previous section does not yet 
have the status of a generally acknowledged theory. This, together 
with the fact that it is not completely formalized, suggests relaxing the 
standards of comparison as far as formal structure is concerned. At the 
present stage, results of comparison that can be logically proved would 
not be ultimately convincing because one always might try (and suc- 
ceed) to escape by changing the power theory. Nevertheless, formal 
comparison is the most important dimension of comparison we have, 
so it will be discussed first. 
Consider two models of the respective theories, a model of game 
theory of the form <(p,, . . . ,p,),A,, . . . ,A,,Ul, . . . ,Un>, and a 
model <{p,p*), E(b),E(a),E*(b),E*(a)> of power theory. In the light of the 
interpretations of the different components of these models, some for- 
mal identifications are possible. First of all, the individuals in both 
models can be the same. The possible difference in number of indi- 
viduals is not essential; for the sake of comparison we may restrict 
ourselves to models consisting of just two individuals on either side. 
Next, let us look at the sets of alternatives attached to the individuals. 
The alternatives themselves may be compared without difficulty. Any 
alternative open to an individual in game theory may be taken as an 
alternative for the same individual in a model of power theory, and 
vice versa. However, in the model of power theory each individual 
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has two sets of alternatives, one before and one after power is exer- 
cised. The game-theoretic model, on the other hand, does not contain 
a distinction of before and after. Starting from the game-theoretic model, 
we may try to build up a power-theoretic model by taking over the 
individuals and by taking the game-theoretic sets of alternatives to be 
the power-theoretic sets of alternatives present before power is exer- 
cised. The problem then is how to fix the sets of alternatives afterward. 
Of course, simple identification would not work, for in power theory, 
the two sets of a person's alternatives before and after may be differ- 
ent. 
However, formal comparison is not restricted to a term-by-term 
identification. It may involve further constructions using the full theo- 
retical pictures of either theory to be compared. In the present case, it 
seems possible to construct reasonable sets of alternatives before and 
after out of one game-theoretical set of alternatives by using the addi- 
tional structure of the game-theoretical model. Consider first the case 
in which individual p,% set of alternatives after power is exercised is 
smaller than that before; i.e., the effect of exercising power was to 
eliminate one or more of p,'.. alternatives (by force, for example). In 
this case the following kind of identification suggests itself. We may 
look for a game-theoretic model in which the sets of alternatives are 
just those occurring in the power-theoretic model "before." Now for 
any alternative to be eliminated and for any state resulting from that 
alternative in the sense of the section on game theory, pl's utility should 
be smaller than that for any alternative not to be eliminated and for 
any state resulting from the latter. In other words, the states resulting 
from those alternatives to be eliminated have minimal utility for pl 
irrespective of what the other individual chooses to do. Taking such a 
model of game theory (which can be easily defined), we may identify 
the sets of alternatives "after" in the power-theoretic model with the 
sets obtained by taking*away the minimal alternatives just described 
in the game-theoretic model. If we manage to find a game-theoretic 
model in which those minimal alternatives are uniquely determined 
(which we always can find), we can construct the power-theoretic sets 
of alternatives out of the sets of game-theoretic alternatives in the way 
just described. A similar kind of construction may be performed in the 
second possible case in which exercise of power leads to an extension 
of the set of alternatives present before. 
These constructions show that different power-theoretic sets of 
alternatives can be obtained out of one set of game-theoretic alterna- 
tives if we choose appropriate models possessing further properties 
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on the game-theoretic side. Of course, the construction cannot succeed 
for any given pair of models. Nevertheless, the method provides rather 
strong identifications: For any given game-theoretic model (with two 
individuals), we may trivially find some power-theoretic model such 
that the sets of alternatives "before" in the latter are identical with the 
sets of alternatives in the former. Conversely, for any given power- 
theoretic model we may find a game-theoretic model with additional 
special properties such that the sets of alternatives of the first model 
before and after can be constructed out of those of the second model 
as described above. 
A third component of the two models that might be seen as a 
candidate for formal comparison consists of the utility functions and 
valuation functions. Here things become difficult. Purely formally, the 
problem is this. If alternatives are identified along the lines just con- 
sidered, then the arguments of a game-theoretic utility function and a 
power-theoretic valuation function are different. Whereas the valua- 
tion function takes a single alternative as argument, the utility func- 
tion needs a resulting state in the technical sense, i.e., an n-tuple of 
alternatives. If the alternatives are identified one by one in two corre- 
sponding models, such identification is impossible for utility and valu- 
ation functions. Still, we may try to construct one from the other as we 
previously did for the alternatives themselves. Starting from a power- 
theoretic model, we might construct a corresponding game-theoretic 
model as follows. Individuals and alternatives (before, say) are taken 
over as above. We define each p,'s utility function, U,, as being inde- 
pendent of other individuals' choices; i.e., if <a,, . . . ,an> and 
<aI*, . . . ,an*> are resulting states such that a,=ai*, then U, 
(a,, . . . ,an)=Ui(a,*, . . . ,an*). A simple way to achieve this is to de- 
fine U,(a,, . . . ,an)=Vl(ai). In the game theoretic model thus constructed, 
the utility functions cannot be strictly identified with those of the 
power-theoretic model. They can be regarded, however, as inessential 
formal variants of the latter. Intuitively, the utility pi gets from a list of 
choices <a,, . . . ,an> is just the value that p, attaches to the alterna- 
tive ai from her own set of alternatives. For this value the choices of 
other individuals do not matter. It seems possible to obtain game- 
theoretic "descriptions" of every power-theoretic model in this way. 
Conversely, if we start with a game-theoretic model, we can get a 
power-theoretic "image" by giving up a one-by-one identification of 
alternatives and simply taking the power-theoretic alternatives to be 
the n-tuples of alternatives from the model of game theory. This yields 
a straightforward identification of utilities and values by defining the 
valuation functions to be the same as the utility functions. 
Game Theo y and Power Theory: A Critical Comparison 71 
In summary, there are quite substantial possibilities of formal com- 
parison and identification between models of game theory and power 
theory. They indicate that both theories have the same or very similar 
applications and objects. The meanings of the terms "individual" and 
"alternative" may be kept unchanged, and the meanings of "utility" 
and "valuation" may be identified to a large extent. These facts agree 
with the informal observation that both theories deal with similar kinds 
of phenomena-at least in a large area of overlap. This may be ex- 
pressed by saying that there are many real situations or systems that 
can be captured simultaneously by models of game and power theory. 
The situation of the prisoner's dilemma gives rise to a power-theoretic 
model if we concentrate on the district attorney's exercise of power 
over the two criminals, and the politician's blackmail may easily be 
analyzed to yield a model of game theory. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to obtain a satisfactory, complete 
comparison that would show that one theory can be completely "re- 
produced" in the other. The previous discussion was "local," i.e., two 
corresponding terms were considered without looking at the impact 
of their comparison on the other parts of the models. We did not take 
into account whether the identifications considered are all compatible 
with each other and did not ask whether they are compatible with the 
basic axioms characterizing the models on each side. A full inter- 
theoretical relation would imply that not only one theory's terms can 
be matched with, or constructed out of, those of the other theory, but 
also that the basic axioms are related by implication, at least in addi- 
tion to some translation or identification of the terms involved. It is 
obvious that neither theory is a specialization or a theoretization of the 
other. It is less clear whether one of them can be reduced in a precise 
sense to the other.16 This would require, among other things, a relation 
of derivability of the axioms. It is far from clear whether the basic 
axiom of rationalfty characteristic of game theory as formulated above 
implies, or is implied by, the basic axiom of change in power theory, 
even if appropriate constructions of the kind discussed earlier are in- 
serted. Intuitively, this does not seem possible as long as natural kinds 
of translations of the terms are used. However, it is not easy to say 
which kinds of translations of one theory's terms into terms of the 
other are natural. 
It is not our aim here to show that one of the theories is fully 
reducible to the other. This would show that the reduced theory in 
some sense is more restricted and "poorer" than the other, and in this 
sense could be replaced by the other one. Rather, the aim of the previ- 
ous formal comparison was to show that both theories have very much 
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in common: terms, meanings of terms, and a large overlapping set 
of applications. If this is so, if both theories' models are sufficiently 
different and if neither theory can be reduced to the other, they are 
rivals, at least in their domain of overlap. We state this result for later 
reference: 
(1) Game the0 y and power the0 y are rival theories in a large domain of 
common applications. There are many ways to establish or construct 
identities between models of the two theories. 
Having stressed these identities, we may now turn to the differ- 
ences. Clearly, the basic axioms of both theories are rather different 
from each other, not only in formulation but alsq in spirit. The game- 
theoretic axiom of rationality requires that all individuals choose alter- 
natives that make up a point of equilibrium, i.e., alternatives that under 
the constraints of the game for each individual yield utilities that in 
some sense can be called maximal. In Nash equilibrium, for instance, 
they are maximal because any deviation from the chosen alternative 
would yield a decrease in utility for the individual who deviates. This 
axiom requires behavior disciplined by the rules of the game: reflec- 
tion on what the other individuals' alternatives and utilities are and a 
kind of calculation of one's own best (equilibrium) choice from a rather 
complicated range of choices. The power-theoretic axiom of change is 
very different. It cannot be regarded as a rule of behavior; it is purely 
descriptive. It just states that one individual changes the action- 
environment of the other. It does not have any implications of ratio- 
nality or maxirnization of utility. An exercise of power can be entirely 
irrational in the sense of yielding utilities that, for both the subordi- 
nate and the superordinate agent, are much lower than those resulting 
from a choice of other alternatives. The axiom of change implies nei- 
ther strategic consideration of the possibilities of the other agent or 
agents nor evaluation of one possibility against another. It does not 
rule out such behavior, of course, but it also does not require it. 
It seems difficult to draw some natural link between those two 
requirements. No translation of either axiom that would turn the trans- 
lated statement into one derivable from, or implying, the other axiom 
seems possible. On the other hand, in the light of statement (1) above, 
there has to be some connection. We may get a better understanding 
by trying to add each axiom to the frame or surrounding of the other 
one. First, what would it mean to add the axiom of rationality to that 
of change? In the model of power theory, there are two places where 
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the axiom of rationality could be added. First, it could be added on the 
superordinate agent's side, so that her action that causes the change of 
the other agent's action-environment is rationally chosen, i.e., in a way 
to maximize her own valuation. Second, the subordinate agent might 
be required to change her action-environment in a rational way, namely 
such that the changed environment yields better courses of action than 
were previously available given the superordinate agent's action. Al- 
though it is not clear whether the second possibility still falls under 
the established paradigm of rational behavior, it is still a genuine pos- 
sibility. Both these extra assumptions would amount to an additional 
feature not present in the original models. So power theory might be 
enriched by assumptions of rationality. 
Conversely, there is no clear way to add the assumption of a change 
of action-environment to those of game theory. If we try to construct 
something like an individual's action-environment in a given game- 
theoretic model, we are bound to fail. On the one hand, in a given 
model there are no means to identify an individuals' valuation of his 
alternatives. Utilities are given only for resulting states, and from these 
there is no general way to obtain a valuation of single alternatives. On 
the other hand, the idea of change is alien to the game-theoretic model, 
as we argued earlier. Game theory assumes that the rules of the game, 
including utilities and alternatives, are given and stable. 
The two possibilities of adding the assumptions of one theory to 
those of the other show a certain asymmetry. It is easily possible to 
add assumptions of rationality to those of power theory, but it is diffi- 
cult to add assumptions of changes of action-environments to those of 
game theory. This indicates that power theory starts from a more fun- 
damental level. By adding rationality, we ascend to the higher level of 
game theory. Conversely, to ascend from game theory to power theory 
in this way is difficult, as just discussed, and there is no way to de- 
scend from game theory to power theory by omitting the assumption 
of rationality. 
This leads to a fundamental difficulty: by adding an assumption 
of change to game theory, we obtain a set of assumptions that contra- 
dicts the basic presupposition of game theory, namely that the rules of 
the game are given and stable. This is a situation whose significance 
can be seen by reflection on other episodes in science. Feyerabend 
proposed that two theories related in this way ire incommensurable. 
According to his proposal, two theories are called incommensurable if 
and only if the meaning of their essential descriptive terms rests on 
contradictory principles.17 Now principles on which the meaning of a 
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theory's essential descriptive terms rest have traditionally been called 
presuppositions. So Feyerabend's characterization amounts to saying 
that the theories' presuppositions contradict each other. By a slight 
liberalization-allowing for presuppositions as well as for axioms- 
we obtain the case before us. Two theories are incommensurable if and 
only if their axioms or presuppositions contradict each other.'* Of 
course, this stipulation makes sense only in the presence of a strong 
overlap of applications df the theories in question as guaranteed by (1) 
above. 
So we have finally arrived at the thesis mentioned in the introduc- 
tion: game theory and power theory are incommensurable. They are 
rival approaches to a large array of common phenomena, they have 
many features (terms and meanings) in common, but $eir models and 
basic assumptions are distinct to an extent that makes full comparison 
difficult if not impossible. Further, the axioms of power theory contra- 
dict the presuppositions of game theory. The first three points have 
emerged in this section. The contradiction of basic axioms and presup- 
positions is justified by our earlier elaboration of those axioms and the 
game-theoretic presupposition. 
Some objections that rest mainly on misunderstanding may be 
dealt with right away. A first objection consists in pointing out that 
game theory can describe exertions of power. This is acknowledged. 
The point, however, is that it can do so only in the given frame of the 
rules of the game. Since the essence of power consists in changing 
these rules, game theory fails to grasp the essential feature of power. A 
more subtle version of this objection refers to forms of influencing 
each other's choices, in particular in connection with supergames. The 
tit-for-tat strategy mentioned above, for instance, may be seen as a 
means by which player p tries to influence her opponent to play coop- 
eratively. Again, the objection does not take into account the presup- 
position of game theory that the rules of the game are given. In the 
present example this means that every player's supergame strategies 
are fixed before the game begins and are known to each player. The 
opponent p*, therefore, will not see tit-for-tat as a means to coax her to 
play cooperatively. She chooses her strategy in the light of all given 
strategies of p, one of which is tit-for-tat. If p* in fact chooses some 
strategy that takes into account p's playing tit-for-tat, we cannot say 
that p changed p*'s action-environment by playing tit-for-tat. p* chooses 
her alternative before p's move, not knowing which strategy p actually 
will play. p*'s only "reaction" (the term is not really appropriate) is a 
reaction to the given set of p's strategies. Still, it may be said that the 
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existence of suitable strategies or alternatives in a game changes the 
players' action-environment, for if they were not present, the players 
would choose differently. This is correct, but in this form the statement 
is no longer an objection. For now it is not the other player that in- 
duces a change, but the existence of certain strategies, i.e., the rules of 
the game. The initial objection confuses behavior caused by the rules 
of the game with behavior caused by the other player's behavior. In 
game theory the latter cannot occur. 
A second objection is that the theory of power presented here is 
inadequate because it completely neglects rationality. A "good" theory 
of power, it is held, should incorporate rational agents from the begin- 
ning. To this there are two replies. First, as mentioned already, we 
easily may add features of rational behavior to the model of power 
theory. So the present theory may serve as a basis on which a fuller 
theory of "rational power" may be erected. Second, by not incorporat- 
ing those features in the basic models, we have a much more general 
point of departure. Humans may be rational, but we certainly do not 
always behave rationally. So the theory of "rational power" envisaged 
is not a theory more adequate than the one considered here, but only a 
special case of the latter, or more technically, a theoretization. 
A third objection holds that the phenomena of exercising power 
and of playing games are disjoint, so that the two theories presented 
here are as well. In other words, the phenomena both theories deal 
with are different, so the theories have no common applications. If this 
were so, a claim of incommensurability would make no sense, for 
incommensurability presupposes that the two theories are rivals and 
have many common applications. We have to be careful here to make 
clear what we mean by the phenomena studied by a theory. This term 
may be used with two different meanings. It may refer to the brute 
facts, the real systems as given completely independent of the theory 
in question. But it also may refer to the facts or systems as seen from 
the point of view of that theory. The brute fact of a man knocking 
down another man under ordinary conditions is one phenomenon, the 
situation seen as an exercise of power is another phenomenon, and the 
situation seen as a scene played realistically for the camera installed 
further away is a third phenomenon. We admit that a real situation as 
seen from the point of view of power the0 j and a real situation as 
seen from the point of view of game theory may be different. Never- 
theless, there is some real situation giving rise to the two interpreta- 
tions, though we cannot say much about it. But the claim that power 
theory and game theory have overlapping domains of application is 
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meant in the sense that there are common brute facts or real systems 
in the first sense just mentioned. By "application" we mean a process 
starting at a level independent of the theory in question, a process 
including conceptualization in a first step. A real system may be con- 
ceptualized in different ways and thus may give rise to the application 
of two different theories. In these meanings of "phenomenon" and 
"application" our assumption of an overlap between game and power 
theory is rather trivial. Examples of systems to which either theory can 
be applied have been mentioned already, and the reader can easily 
come up with others. 
The theme of incommensurability has been much discussed re- 
cently, and several definition~ have been proposed. Kuhn has linked it 
to more comprehensive entities like Gestalt, world-views, and 
sociopsychological features. Cases of incommensurAble theories can 
be identified at the sociopsychological level by continuous unproduc- 
tive discussions by proponents on both sides in which no real argu- 
ments are advanced and propagandistic elements are substantial. The 
transition from one such theory to the other, or from one theory's 
model to a model of the other theory, involves a Gestalt-switch, a 
radical and deep reinterpretation or reorientation. Finally, the two theo- 
ries are closely associated with different comprehensive views about 
the world or substantial parts of it.19 
These further characterizations of incommensurability may be used 
to further justify our hypothesis. All three features are present in our 
case. First, there is little communication between scholars of the two 
camps. I have myself experienced rather emotional and bitter discus- 
sions when the comparison was brought up. Second, the transition 
from one model to the other involves something like a Gestalt-switch. 
Game-theoretic individuals are independent of each other as far as the 
game is concerned, they are equal to each other as far as the game is 
concerned, they are free to play the game, and they stick to the rules of 
the game. The picture usually associated with the notion of power is 
one of everyone being everyone else's enemy. Individuals are neither 
independent nor equal. Exercise of power is the open expression of 
dependence and inequality. The subordinate agents are not free to 
leave the situation captured by a model of power theory. There are no 
rules of the game, there is only the rule of the stronger. Third, these 
strong contrasts point to more comprehensive views about humans 
and society. Game theory is in line with Hobbesian ideas of social 
contract as a means to establish social order, while power theory looks 
at social order essentially as a means to stabilize social stratification. 
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I do not want to close with passages that give the impression of a 
political fight rather than of a scientific study. If my analysis is correct, 
then both theories are rivals insofar as they have a large array of 
common applications and their models are quite different from each 
other (perhaps irreducibly). Furthermore, the basic axiom of power 
theory contradicts the basic presupposition of game theory, which ac- 
cording to Feyerabend means that both theories are incommensurable. 
However, in contrast to the situation in the natural sciences, incom- 
mensurability here does not mean that both theories or their propo- 
nents have to fight until one approach is eliminated and replaced. This 
pattern may be typical for physics, but it is not typical for social sci- 
ence. In physics, incommensurabilities are rather small, and the victo- 
rious theory usually incorporates all or most of the achievements of 
the losing theory. In our case, this is quite different. If one of the two 
accounts were to replace and eliminate the other one, this would mean 
a substantial loss. If power theory were simply replaced by game theory, 
the axiom of change would get lost. In game theory, there is nothing to 
indicate that individuals try to change each other's action-environ- 
ments. Conversely, if game theory were given up in favor of power 
theory, the assumption of rationality inherent in game theory would 
no longer be made. In this case, one might enrich power theory by 
such an assumption, but the point is that mere replacement (without 
enrichment) would not save the basic assumptions of the replaced 
theory. This situation is not found only in the case of the two theories 
considered here, it also obtains for other pairs of theories in social 
science, such as microeconomics versus game theory, microeconomics 
versus power theory, or Marxian value theory versus any of the other 
three. 
The significance of incommensurability in the social sciences must 
not be judged by means of its significance in the natural sciences, 
namely that one of the two rival theories will ultimately replace the 
other one. But then incommensurability loses its frightening aspect. If 
we imagine incommensurable theories in peaceful coexistence, another 
term seems appropriate: cornplementarity. Each theory focuses on one 
particular side or dimension or surface of the common real systems, 
and though the picture obtained is in some sense a complete descrip- 
tion of the systems, it is incomplete insofar as there are other sides or 
dimensions or surfaces of the same systems that, when described in 
terms of another theory, make them look quite different. Game theory 
and power theory, in fact, are complementary in this sense. Game 
theory focuses on the rational, calculating aspect of human beings, 
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while power theory concentrates on the inherited Wille zur Macht. 
These are two sides of human existence that perhaps cannot be united 
without residue, and so each of them becomes important as a branch 
of social scientific research. 
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Notes to Chapter 5 
1. Brian Fay, Critical Social Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1987), 120. My emphasis. 
2. I want to stress that both the example that I am using and the model 
that I am developing are necessarily abstract. In order to see how situated 
power works, both at a theoretical level and in terms of the example of grad- 
ing, I shall abstract from various other features of the concrete situation in 
which teachers and students find themselves in order to focus my attention 
upon the manner in which a set of social relationships external to the teacher- 
student relationship constitutes that relationship as a power relationship. 
3. There are institutions of higher education like Hampshire College that 
evaluate rather than grade their students. I leave out of consideration how 
such a divergence affects the power between students and teachers. The teacher- 
student relationship that I am discussing here is the standard one in American 
higher education. 
4. Fay, Critical Social Science, 120. 
5. Fay's use of "causal outcome" in his definition of power is also prob- 
lematic. My telling you that today is a holiday may have as a causal outcome 
a change in your actions, but this does not mean that I have exercised power 
over you. 
6. Previous social theorists have talked about "anticipatory reaction" in 
this context. See Car1 J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory 
of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), Chapter 11, for an elaboration of 
this concept. The problem with this concept is that it describes the existence of 
such power as dependent solely upon the subordinate agent. 
